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No Shortage of Tanks!
The Canadian Army’s System for the Recovery,
Repair and Replacement of A and B Vehicles
and Major Weapons Systems
ARTHUR GULLACHSEN
Abstract : This article is an overview of the First Canadian Army in
North West Europe’s ability to recover, repair and damaged, destroyed
and broken down vehicles and weapons systems. This capability was a
crucial factor in maintaining the overall combat power of the Canadian
Army Overseas during operations in the last year of war. To support this
argument the author examines Canadian wartime primary documents as
well as multiple secondary sources.

G

of combat operations during the
Canadian Army’s period of service in North West Europe
(nwe) during the last eleven months of the war in 1944-1945, an
effective system of equipment recovery, repair and replacement was
essential. While what has been written on wartime equipment and
vehicle repair, recovery and replacement has mainly focussed on
German armoured forces 1939-1945, little focus has been devoted
to researching these capabilities within Allied units. Whether or
not a Canadian unit’s offensive and defensive capabilities were at a
high level during this time period was dependent on the number of
iven the high intensity
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operational vehicles and major weapons systems that were available.1
The “A” and “B” categories of vehicle classification, taken from the
British Army system, encompassed nearly all vehicles within the
Canadian Army in the late war period. The “A” vehicle category
included nearly all heavy and light armoured combat types and the
“B” classification encompassed all lighter, soft-skinned, wheeled
supply and general service types. If a unit’s equipment inventories
were significantly below their war establishment levels, its level of
military effectiveness would be impaired. These establishment levels
were the organizational guides that determined how each combat
arms unit was equipped in the way of personnel, vehicles, equipment
and weapons in order to conduct its mission. Canadian units suffered
equipment losses due to all causes, and often at a rapid rate within
infantry, armoured and anti-tank regiments, often making their real
strength below war establishment levels. Unit activity and exposure
to enemy action determined how rapidly losses such as this occurred.
Accidents and normal wear and tear were also unrelenting, taking
vehicles and weapons systems out of action just as effectively as
enemy action.
The operational record, systems and structure of First Canadian
Army’s repair and replacement services for “A” and “B” vehicles and
major weapons systems in nwe will be examined within this article.
That these organizations were remarkably successful at achieving their
main goal of maintaining the combat strength of the Canadian Army
Overseas (cao) is the conclusion presented. The historical significance
of these processes lies in their level of effectiveness. Nearly always
fully functional, these processes allowed Canadian combat formations
to maintain their strength in the face of a sustained level of high losses
over an extended period. By addressing the question of how Canadian
combat arms units maintained their equipment strength, this article
contributes to the wider debate on Allied military effectiveness, the
value of the size of the Allied support units compared to combat units,
and aids the goal of a larger understanding of the unique methods
used by the Western Allies to pursue their war aims.

1  
LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,553. 21st AG. A & B Canadian Vehicle Position Report,
File 215A21.085 (D1). Monthly returns from May 1944 to May 1945 detail exactly
what was considered an “A” or “B” vehicle, and how many were held at the divisional,
corps and army level. Within the British Army, all combat vehicles were classified as
“A” vehicles, while non-combat soft-skinned vehicles were classified as “B” vehicles.
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Never wanting for an acceptable level of vehicles and heavy
weapons systems allowed Canadian units to remain combat effective
for the vast majority of the time during 1944-1945. In contrast to
German forces, new and repaired vehicles and weapons systems
reached front-line artillery, armoured and infantry units at a much
faster rate and in larger quantities. The Corps of Royal Canadian
Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (rceme) epitomized this
contrast in organizational structure and performance as they were
largely separated from the combat arms units they serviced past
the second line of maintenance, making them much more effective.
This article will discuss the process of delivering new and repaired
vehicles and weaponry first, including a description of the specialist
organizations involved. This will be followed by an outline of the
rceme recovery and repair system, its evolution as an organization
and its performance in the field.
Critical secondary sources analyzing the process of repairing and
replacing vehicles and major weapons systems within the late war
Canadian Army are virtually non-existent. The author has tried
to partly fill this gap with a previous article entitled “Destroying
the Panthers: The Effect of Allied Combat Action on I./ss Panzer
Regiment 12 in Normandy, 1944”, which in part compares Canadian
replacement and recovery techniques with those of the German
Panzerwaffe, or tank arm.2 In this article the significance of efficient
recovery and replacement techniques within Canadian armoured
formations was highlighted as vital to those unit’s operation and
combat capability. While other works exist on the repair and
maintenance of German armoured vehicles, writing on maintaining
and replacing Allied vehicles or major weapons systems mainly
consists of official histories and small details within larger areas of
operational research. There are two exceptions, focused on American
and Soviet forces. The first is Belton Y. Cooper’s Death Traps: The
Survival of an American Armoured Division in wwii .3 Written by
a Combat Command Ordnance Officer and published in 1998, this is
a first-hand account of the staggering tank losses encountered by the
2  
Arthur Gullachsen, “Destroying the Panthers: The Effect of Allied Combat Action
on I./SS Panzer Regiment 12 in Normandy, 1944,” Canadian Military History, 25,
2, Article 13 (2016): 1-29, http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol25/iss2/13 (accessed 10
May 2017).
3  
Belton Y. Cooper, Death Traps: The Survival of an American Armoured Division
in WWII (New York: Presidio Press, 1998).
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u. s .

Army at the hands of German weapons systems and the effort
needed to maintain the strength of u. s . armoured formations. The
second is “Tank Repair and the Red Army in w wii” by Gary w wii .
Dickson. Using Russian archival and secondary sources, this article
illustrates the importance tank maintenance played in allowing Red
Army Tank Corps to maintain their strength in a series of neverending armoured offensives from 1941-19454
As the larger twin to the personnel replacement organization, the
1st Canadian Echelon within 21st Army Group headquarters dealt
with the equipment and weaponry concerns of the First Canadian
Army. It must be noted however that Canadian command, control and
administration had its limitations. Like all wartime Commonwealth
armies, the cao was dependent on the will and ability of the British
government to supply it with large amounts war material.5 By late
1943, a majority of Canadian units designated for the 1944 invasion of
the continent were properly equipped and training intensively.6 As the
campaign in Normandy raged in the summer of 1944, the continued
stockpiling of large amounts of war material on the continent was
not a great challenge. This was due to the Battle of the Atlantic
being largely won by late 1943, Allied economies reaching their full
production capacities by mid-1944, and the Normandy beachhead
being securely established in June of that year.7 British political
will and ample cooperation with the Canadian government was also
present, and this allowed the Canadian military to be equipped and
4  
Gary A. Dickson, “Tank Repair and the Red Army in World War II”, The
Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 25, 3 (2012): 381-92, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1351
8046.2012.705650 (accessed 10 May 2017).
5  
Canadiansoliders.com, “4th Canadian (Armoured) Division”, http://www.
canadiansoldiers.com/organization/fieldforces/casf/4thdivision.htm (accessed 14
January, 2016); Charles Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the
Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North
West Europe 1944-45 (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary,
1960), 247-52. As of October 1942, the 4th Canadian Armoured Division only had
255 Universal Bren Gun Carriers with which to train with. It did not receive tanks
until later.
6  
John English, The Canadian Army in the Normandy Campaign: A Study in the
Failure of High Command (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Works, 2009), 104.
7  
Richard Holmes, ed., The Oxford Companion to Military History (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2001), 105, 655. The decisive convoy battles that broke
the back of German submarine arm occurred in mid-1943. The Allies in Normandy
were superbly supplied despite storms which damaged their artificial harbours in
June 1944. John Ellis, Brute Force (London: Andre Deutsch, 1990), 526, Statistical
Appendix: Tables 26-63. Allied war production peaked during 1944.
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The remains of Sherman tanks and carriers waiting to be broken up at a British vehicle dump
in Normandy, 1 August 1944. [© IWM (B 8394)]

re-supplied as needed. As a result, the cao enjoyed full access to
a well-stocked common pool of largely American Lend-Lease and
British produced equipment.8
The total amount of equipment removed from the strength of
combat arms units on the front line because of mechanical failure
or enemy action usually amounted to 100 per cent of the unit
establishment within several months. The total number of vehicles
within a battalion-sized regiment in the Canadian Army was spread
between its administrative echelons. These three echelons consisted
of the A1 (Fighting) echelon, with everything needed to carry out
the combat mission, the A2 Echelon, which had everything needed

G.W.L Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada: The History of the Royal Regiment
of Canadian Artillery Volume II: 1919-1945 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd,
1972.), 55-58. As an example, on arrival in England all Royal Canadian Artillery
(RCA) regiments were completely equipped with British produced equipment in the
years 1939-1942.

8  
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to immediately resupply the A1 Echelon, and the small B Echelon,
which consisted of all supply and stores items not immediately
needed and the administrative support elements required to keep a
battalion-sized combat grouping functioning. Vehicle attrition in the
three echelons within combat arms units was due to excessive use,
enemy action and travel over harsh terrain. The highest equipment
losses for the Canadian Army in nwe occurred during the three
months of the Normandy Campaign. Combat in Normandy was
more intense and affected a greater number of combat arms units
than subsequent infantry-oriented battles during late 1944 and early
1945 in the Netherlands and the Rhineland. During this time, a
greater amount of German heavy weapons and armoured vehicles
were present within multiple German panzer divisions, the Canadian
Army’s primary opponent in the months of June–August 1944. The
fighting power of these German formations made a sizeable impact on
the monthly totals of Canadian equipment losses. These totals drop
off markedly once the campaign in Normandy came to a halt in late
August, and are relatively low on average for the reminder of the war,
as remaining German armoured forces were mainly engaged to the
south against British and u. s . armies.
As an example, of the sixty-one Sherman tanks the 6th Canadian
Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars) fielded on D-Day, nearly all were
lost to enemy action or mechanical failure by the end of August
1944. The Hussar Sherman tank “Holy Roller”, now a monument
in London, Ontario, was the only one to survive in the regiment’s
possession from D-Day until the end of hostilities.9 Enemy action was
not often the real threat. Tanks sent away for heavy maintenance
would often return with another unit, or not at all, being replaced
by a newer variant that was more technologically advanced. The fate
of “Holy Roller” was very much the exception rather than the rule.
The administrative system designed to replace all Canadian
equipment losses was sophisticated. As illustrated in Chart 1, there
were a total of five administrative areas within the First Canadian
Army’s area of operations. From the front lines to the rear areas,
these zones consisted of the divisional administrative area, the corps

The Family of Captain Proctor Clifford Neil, “Captain Neil’s Story ~ Bio &
Military Cross Award,” In Captain Proctor Clifford Neil: Honouring the life and
accomplishments of a WWII Hero, http://www.captainpcneil.com/holy-roller.html
(accessed 5 July 2016).

9  
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Chart 1: Path of new major weapons systems and “A” & “B” vehicles (excluding heavy
armoured fighting vehicles).11

troops area, the corps administrative area, the forward maintenance
area and the line of communications area.10 Canadian 1st Echelon
control of major weapons systems and vehicle logistics began with
the Canadian Army Ordnance Maintenance Company (omc), which
was actually much larger strength than a company. It consisted of
a headquarters, a regulating station section, a stores section, an
ammunition section and a tank section. It received all manner of
supplies, vehicles and equipment from British-controlled vehicle and
ordnance depots located within close transportation distance to the
First Canadian Army rail or road head.

John Grodzinski, Operational Handbook for the First Canadian Army, 1944-45:
Formation Organization, Staff Technique and Administration (Lower Sackville: The
Regimental Historian, 1996), 91.
11  
Ibid, 92-93.
10  
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Rail and road heads were located in the Line of Communications
Area and were the logistical start points for the Canadian Army in
nwe . There were often multiple First Canadian Army rail and road
heads in existence during 1944-1945 as the front moved forward. At
these rail and road heads various Royal Canadian Army Service
Corps (rcasc) units and numbered supply depots were present. The
Canadian Army omc then distributed what it received from the
British Army to Canadian army-level equipment storage locations,
fuel and ammunition dumps and vehicle parks. Before anything
moved or entered storage, the omc and road and rail head personnel
worked to prepare all war material for these possibilities as required.
In a reverse flow, these road and rail heads also received damaged or
obsolete equipment that had been removed from the front.12
If railroad transport was not available, new vehicles and
ordnance was driven forward by second-line transport from the
line of communication area depots to the corps-level ordnance field
park.13 Second-line transport consisted of trucks and other assets
operated at the corps and army level; first line being those in the
fighting divisions and their formations. There was eventually a total
of two ordnance field parks within the First Canadian Army in April
1945.14 The corps-level ordnance field park would contain everything
in order to support a complete army corps, with the exception of
rations, water and petroleum products. All forms of heavy and light
weapons and quantities of all types of ammunition and spares for all
weapon assemblies were present. Smaller stores such as small arms,
optics, engineer, signals and workshop equipment were also held.
Large parking areas contained row upon row of new and repaired
“A” and “B” type vehicles. Only light “A” vehicles were present, the
heavier armoured fighting vehicles (afv s) having their own separate
transport and replacement system. On top of all this, quantities of
specialist “A” and “B” vehicles (command vehicles, wireless trucks,
recovery vehicles and specialist light tracked carriers) were present.15
This park then fed the forward division-level ordnance field parks
and respective armoured or infantry Sub Field Parks. From these
Ibid, 92-93.
Ibid, 92. Second-line transport was corps and army-level transport, and first-line
transport was attached to divisional units.
14  
Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 661, Appendix F: Order of battle for all
Canadian Army units in NWE.
15  
John Grodzinski, Operational Handbook, 92-93.
12  
13  
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parks, deliveries were made to further supply points or the items
were signed for on a need basis as regimental units required them.
For smaller deliverable items that could be pushed forward, these
parks supplied divisional Delivery Points (dp s). At these dp s, unit
B Echelon (supply and administrative) troops of the combat arms
regiments showed up to sign for authorized equipment, vehicles,
weapons and supplies on a need basis.
The weapons systems delivered to the Canadian Army omc
that required the largest logistical resources to transport them
to the front were heavy armoured fighting vehicles (afv s). As
depicted in Chart 2, these were cut away from the remainder of the
logistical process at the omc and began their own transport path.
These vehicles were the major weapons systems of the armoured,
armoured reconnaissance, self-propelled field artillery and anti-tank
units. Prior to large scale operations, Canadian armoured regiments
saw it as imperative to have the number of operational tanks be
close as possible to the war establishment tables. The 2nd Canadian
Armoured Brigade’s strength as of 31 January 1945, immediately
prior to February’s Operation Veritable, was 214 tanks against a war
establishment figure of 226.16 Units containing armour would report
their replacement needs through an afv or tank state that would be
reported on a daily or weekly basis. These daily and weekly returns
from the regimental headquarters (r hq) of each unit were forwarded
up the chain of command. For example, an armoured regiment’s
afv state would indicate a daily summary of “fitness” for 75mm
cruiser tanks (Sherman), 17-pounder (Pr) Fireflies (Sherman Ic or
Vc with the longer gun) and 37mm reconnaissance (M3 Stuart) light
tanks. “Fit” would refer to an afv being fully combat operational.
As of 1 November 1944, the 4th Canadian Armoured Division fielded
247 “fit” tanks of all makes and seventy-nine “fit” scout cars.17 For
rca field artillery and anti-tank units, self-propelled (sp) M-10 tank
destroyers and sp Sexton howitzers would be reported as part of their

LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,553. 21st AG. A & B Canadian Vehicle Position Report.
File 215A21.085 (D1). 31 January 1945 return.
17  
LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,793. 4th Canadian Armoured Division A & Q War Diary
November, 1944. T-10550. Return on AFVs within the division, 1 November, 1944.
16  
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gun state.18 At the armoured brigade level the combined states of all
armoured regiments would be forwarded to higher command from
the brigade headquarters. If an armoured unit was short tanks in any
of its troops or squadrons, it would be tasked to receive new afv s at
a certain date. These repaired or new replacement tanks would be
driven to the front, transported by low-bed trailer or loaded onto rail
cars and then received at the B Echelon of the receiving regiment.
The key component of the replacement process for armour was
the 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment (25th cadr). This
regiment was divided into a total of eight functioning squadrons,
titled A through H.19 The 25th cadr squadrons in nwe operated a
sophisticated and efficient system for supplying new and repaired afv s
to all Canadian Army units that operated them. They also supplied
British, Polish and Czech units operating within the Second British
Army and First Canadian Army. The first 25th cadr squadrons
to land in France during June-July 1944 were initially under the
command of the 1st British Corps. These were then incorporated
into the 2nd Canadian Corps and the First Canadian Army after
both became operational in mid-July and early August 1944. “C”
Squadron landed in Normandy on 7 June 1944 and immediately
began transferring tanks to the three armoured regiments of the
2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade.21 On 10 July 1944, “E” Squadron

LAC, RG24 Volume 10,670. Equipment State Canadian Army Monthly Report.
File 215C1.083 (D6). The final report at the Army level was the above monthly
returns of all controlled stores, such as 25-pounder Howitzers and 17-pound antitank guns on a divisional basis.
19  
LAC, RG24 Volume 14,276. C Squadron, 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery
Regiment War Diary June 1944. T-12748. The 25th CADR squadron war diaries
are very detailed regarding actual deliveries of tanks to the units. The only caveat
is that often there are discrepancies between the numbers reported being delivered
to a regiment and the receiving regiment’s strength increase. This was largely due
to breakdowns in transit, delays in reporting and tanks being sent back to delivery
squadron to correct kit deficiencies. It was also noted in the course of this research
that early in the campaign due to a shortage of AFVs there was some “borrowing”
between armoured regiments. Also, when a regiment was in action they often did not
have time to report their strengths and losses. It would take a day or two afterwards
for all tanks and crews to be accounted for.
20  
LAC, RG24 Volume 10,663. Chart 2: First Canadian Army Plans Diagram of
AFV “A” vehicle Recovery, Repair and Replacement. File 215C1.045 (D12). John
Grodzinski, Operational Handbook, 93.
21  
Leonard Curchin, The Elgins: A Regimental History (St. Thomas: The Sutherland
Press, 1977), 78. These regiments had suffered large losses in the period of fighting
6-7 June 1944.
18  
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Chart 2: First Canadian Army system of armoured fighting vehicle (afv) replacement: Paths
of new/repaired afvs to combat arms regiments.20

arrived within the beachhead. This squadron was responsible for tank
deliveries at the 2nd Canadian Corps level. These two squadrons were
followed by “F” Squadron landing on 23 July 1944. This squadron
was to aid in railhead acceptance of afv s and be responsible for
delivery of vehicles at the First Canadian Army level once the army
became operational. In this role, it was also the squadron responsible
for sending tanks to British, Czech and Polish armoured units under
First Canadian Army command. “D” Squadron of the 25th cadr
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Sherman tanks and other vehicles under repair at a REME depot, 3 July 1944. [© IWM (B
6328)]

landed on 26 July 1944, and was responsible for all units within the
4th Canadian Armoured Brigade.22
British stocks of replacement afv s were delivered to large vehicle
depots on the continent near road heads and rail heads by transport
units of the British Army. The Canadian Army receiving procedure
to accept these vehicles into service was quite comprehensive.
Working together in tandem during this process from August 1944
onward was the omc ’s Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps (rcoc)
Tank Railhead Section and the 25th cadr’s “F” squadron. These
two groups would receive a shipment of afv s from the British Army’s
Vehicle Company, Army Ordnance Delivery organization. Once they
Ibid, 78. Once D Squadron disembarked it immediately turned over twenty-two
tanks with full crews to 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade to cover losses suffered
9-10 August 1944.

22  

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol27/iss1/1
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had arrived, the new afv s would have their documents examined
and kit removed and re-checked at the “F” Squadron tank park.
Next, the armament would be degreased and a general cleaning of
the fighting compartment would take place. After this, the sprockets,
road wheels and tracks would be adjusted and repaired as required.
Following this, a general servicing of weapons, radios, and the power
traverse would occur. Any modifications needed would be completed
by the Canadian Army’s 3rd Canadian afv Support Unit and the
4th Canadian Armoured Troops (third-line Maintenance) Workshop,
working alongside “F” Squadron. Once this was concluded, optics,
radios and fragile equipment would be installed or boxed for transport.
Next, all onboard stowage of ammunition would be completed in
accordance with authorized tables. Finally, the Light Aid Detachment
(lad) attached to “F” Squadron would then re-certify all the afv s to
make sure they were mechanically fit. Once this was completed, the
tanks were ready to be sent out.23 If “fit” tanks were not issued right
away, they would be maintained by 25th cadr personnel in the “F”
Squadron tank park.
Once an order was received for tanks to be sent forward, the
appropriate number would then be driven, transported by rail or
loaded onto tank transporters for the trip from “F” Squadron to the
25th cadr corps delivery squadron.24 This squadron would then feed
the two forward delivery squadrons of the 25th cadr present in nwe
in August 1944. Within their operating bases, 25th cadr squadrons
operated “tank circuits”, with each stop in the circuit checking over
an area of the tank. This repetitive inspection and receiving process
at each squadron could take time. While of questionable efficiency,
it was effective at resolving issues vehicles had arrived with and
prevented these problems from reaching armoured regiments in the
field. At any point repaired vehicles which had come from rceme
facilities could join a 25th cadr squadron.

LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,279. F Squadron, 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery
Squadron War Diary, October 1944. On 2 October 1944, several Kangaroo armoured
personnel carriers slated for delivery to the 1st Canadian Armoured Personnel Carrier
Regiment by “F” Squadron, 25th CADR, were instead re-routed back to Royal
Canadian Corps of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (RCEME) maintenance
units due to mechanical issues.
24  
LAC, RG24 Volume 10,457. Tank Replaces and Releases. File 212C1.1009
(D28). Chart detailing the actions of a rear delivery squadron of the 25th Canadian
Armoured Delivery Regiment.
23  
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In order to meet demands for new afv s quickly, 25th cadr
squadrons usually had an afv “float” or balance that they could
draw from, similar to the Canadian Army personnel reinforcement
Canadian Base Reinforcement Group (cbrg) units. This float was
a percentage of the total afv s in service with the front-line units
that a 25th cadr squadron was designated to support. Though this
percentage went up and down with supply and demand, there was
always an effort made to maintain the desired inventory level to deal
with emergencies. This allowed the 25th cadr to be able to respond
very quickly to a recipient unit’s requests for large reinforcements.
The best example of this rapid response capability is the 10 August
1944 delivery by “D” Squadron, 25th cadr of twenty-two fully-crewed
Sherman tanks to the 28th Canadian Armoured Regiment.25 This
regiment had lost forty-four Shermans, two Stuarts, one Crusader
anti-aircraft tank and one scout car totally destroyed in battle
on 9 August 1944.26 This immediate resupply, plus four tanks the
regiment had as a reserve Left Out of Battle (lob) contingent, gave
it a total reinforcement of twenty-six new tanks. This number would
theoretically make it capable of immediate combat operations. On
12 August 1944, a further sixteen tanks were delivered, bringing up
the regiment’s new tank deliveries to thirty-eight for the period 10-12
August 1944.27 The number of tanks delivered in this example and
the speed in which they arrived is very impressive.
The process of afv replacement and repair within an average
Canadian armoured regiment over an eighteen-day period during
August 1944 is depicted in Chart 3. In these two and half weeks,
the 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment lost a significant number
of vehicles due to enemy action and mechanical failure. It had
participated in Operations Totalize, Tractable and the initial battles
of the Falaise Pocket. Though significantly weakened, after the
delivery of new and repaired vehicles, the regiment fielded thirtyeight “fit” tanks on 18 August. With an additional two tanks in

LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,277. D Squadron, 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery
Regiment War Diary August 1944. T-12748. 9 August 1944 entry.
26  
LAC, RG24 Volume 14,292. 28th Canadian Armoured Regiment War Diary
August 1944. T-12764. War Diary entry for 9 August 1944 notes the one-day loss
on Hill 140 of forty-four Shermans, two Stuarts, one Crusader anti-aircraft tank and
one scout car.
27  
LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,277. D Squadron, 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery
Regiment War Diary August 1944. T-12748. 12 August 1944 entry.
25  
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the regimental lad repairable within two days, forty would be “fit”
by 20 August. Though not perfect, this was enough to theoretically
field three squadrons of four troops. Each troop could field three
tanks each, plus four for the headquarters squadron. Other regiments
involved in heavy combat also received large numbers of replacement
tanks in short order. The 25th cadr took an incredibly short time
to become operational on the continent in the wake of D-Day. For
example, to replace the D-Day amphibious assault losses inflicted on
the 1st Hussars (6th Canadian Armoured Regiment), twenty new or
repaired tanks were delivered on 10 June 1944.28
Within the German Army, tank losses due to combat and
mechanical failure were not replaced as efficiently as within the
Canadian Army. As an example, the second battalion of the German
Panzer Lehr Regiment 130 in Normandy was sent only eleven
replacement Panzer IV tanks on 8 July 1944, having received none in
June.29 As illustrated in Chart 4, the effects of combat, mechanical
failure and battle damage on the battalion’s strength in the period
1-26 June 1944 were severe. Repairs were also slow, as they occurred
within the panzer units rather than in specialized separate repair
units. As of 26 June, there were forty-seven Panzer IVs in short and
long-term repair near the chaos of the front lines. Over the course of
the campaign in nwe , the 25th cadr was successful at re-supplying
all Canadian units operating heavy afv s. This was due to large levels
of production from repair workshops and 25th cadr forward delivery
squadrons being able to maintain large “floats”. As an example, “D”
Squadron, 25th cadr delivered a total of 295 new and repaired afv s
to the 4th Canadian Armoured Division during the month of October
1944.32 This was enough to nearly re-equip the entire division.
As illustrated in Charts 5 and 6, Canadian armoured regiments
maintained their strength while opposing German units withered.
It also certainly helped that Allied forces in nwe during 1944-1945
30

31

Michael McNorgan, The Gallant Hussars: A History of the 1st Hussars Regiment
1856-2004 (Alymer, ON: The Alymer Express, 2004), 132.
29  
Niklas Zetterling, Normandy 1944: German Military Organization, Combat Power
and Organizational Effectiveness (Winnipeg: J.J. Fedorowicz, 2000), 386.
30  
LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,287. 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment tank state
report. File 1044.
31  
Niklas Zetterling, Normandy 1944, 390.
32  
LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,278. D Squadron, 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery
Regiment War Diary October 1944. T-12748.
28  
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Chart 3: 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment Sherman 75 mm and Firefly 17-pounder (Pr)
losses, replacements and “fit” status 1-18 August 1944.30

Chart 4: German II./Panzer Lehr Regiment 130’s Panzer IV tank strength returns and losses
due enemy action and mechanical failure 1-26 June 1944.31

possessed total air superiority, had large amounts of replacement
equipment and vehicle movement, and recovery was unimpeded.
The delivery of non-afv major weapons systems and other
equipment did not utilize any special delivery squadrons to transport
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it to a fighting unit. Once past army-level ordnance parks, it was
deposited or driven to corps-level ordnance field parks by second-line
transport. From these locations, it was then moved to the divisionallevel field parks. At the division level, there was a divisional ordnance
field park and a corresponding armoured or infantry ordnance subpark. One of each was allocated to each Canadian armoured or
infantry division.33 The field parks were numbered by the division
number, and the sub-parks were numbered 201-205. For example,
the 5th Canadian Armoured Division’s ordnance depots consisted
of the 5th Canadian Armoured Division Ordnance Field Park and
the 205th Canadian Armoured Ordnance Sub-Park.34 In these large
parks, all manner of equipment, vehicles and stores were located in a
manner similar to the corps level parks. From these points, divisional
units would be authorized on a need basis to help themselves in order
to retain their wartime establishments.
rca field artillery, anti-tank and light anti-aircraft regiments
reported their status in a very similar manner as the armoured
units. For artillery regiments, the guns were their primary piece
of equipment and the number of operational guns and those under
repair was constantly monitored. A gun state of ordnance holdings
accompanied by an ammunition usage report was forwarded each
day by an artillery regiment’s r hq to higher rca command. These
returns were very important, as their data was used to calculate
supply requirements and to gauge ammunition usage.35 The returns
would make their way up the chain of command, and army-level field
ordnance parks would then authorize the release of new equipment to
make up for combat and mechanical losses. New replacement artillery
equipment was held by army group-level British Army ordnance field
parks. The Canadian army-level ordnance park would then receive
new equipment from the omc and move it to the corps-level ordnance

Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 661, Appendix F: Order of Battle for
Canadian Units in NWE.
34  
Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 661, Appendix F: Order of Battle for
Canadian Units in NWE.
35  
LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,661. First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December
1944. T-7093. Ammunition usage and receipts return. 1st British Corps and 2nd
Canadian Corps, 16 December 1944. The guns state was also needed in order to
arrange for the supply of the required amount of ammunition that was needed to
keep it combat capable. Continuous delivery was needed for regular operations and
extra on an irregular basis for larger operations.
33  
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Chart 5: Operational tank strength of 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment’s Sherman tanks
June 1944. War establishment = 50 Shermans.36

Chart 6: Operational tank strength of the German II./ss Panzer Regiment 12’s Panzer IV
tanks, June 1944. War establishment = 101 Pz IVs.37

field parks. Repaired and reconditioned equipment would also be
36

37

Roman J. Jarymowycz, “The Quest for Operational Maneuver in the Normandy
Campaign: Simonds and Montgomery Attempt the Armoured Breakout” (PhD
diss., McGill University, 1997), 336, Appendix E: Strength returns for the 2nd
Canadian Armoured Brigade in June 1944. Because of the quick practice of backloading tanks with any problems past the abilities of the light aid detachment, all
these Shermans must be considered operational.
37  
Norbert Szamverber, Waffen SS Armour in Normandy: The Combat History of
SS-Panzer Regiment 12 and SS-Panzerjager Abteilung 12 Normandy 1944 based
on their original war diaries (Solihull, England: Helion and Company, 2012), 234,
Appendix VII: Tank strength of SS-Panzer Regiment 12 1 June-11 August 1944.
36  
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1st Canadian Armoured Brigade Firefly and Sherman Ib 105mm Sherman in the Hague,
Netherlands, May 1945. [© Ary Koppejan / Nederlands Fotomuseum]

transported by rceme personnel to the division field ordnance parks
and sub-parks, where it would be taken on strength (tos).
The divisional ordnance parks would contain everything in the
way of new and repaired towed artillery pieces, replacement artillery
vehicles and radios. While all artillery equipment and weaponry was
very sophisticated, maintaining and operating it was less complicated
than an afv with its motor, running gear, transmission, power turret
traverse, sights and radios. Compared to a 17-Pounder anti-tank gun,
a Firefly tank was much more challenging from a maintenance and
delivery perspective, hence the lack of a 25th cadr -type organization
exclusively for artillery regiments. The approach to maintaining
sophisticated artillery systems in 1944-1945 was very similar to that
for an “A” or “B” vehicle. The successive “lines” within the rceme
repair system could handle increasingly difficult artillery repairs.
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Guns constantly required maintenance, but this could largely be
completed at the regimental level by the lad. If a gun was worn out
or damaged, it could be easily replaced. A new one would be picked
up at the field ordnance or sub-parks by a gun crew with an artillery
tractor or tower. New or repaired guns were drawn as needed to
replace weapons under repair or that were lost in battle. An example
of a mass draw of new equipment occurred in early August 1944. All
three rca field regiments within the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division
drew an entirely new complement of seventy-two towed 25-Pounder
howitzers, turning it their old 105mm Priest self-propelled guns.38
In nwe during 1944-1945 there were many heavy afv s operated
by non-Canadian Armoured Corps (cac) regiments within the
Canadian Army. These were mainly artillery observation post (op)
tanks, self-propelled artillery, tank destroyers and artillery towers
operated by rca units. These vehicles were delivered by the 25th
cadr in exactly the same manner as a Sherman Firefly tank was
delivered to an armoured regiment. Universal Carriers, T-16 and
M-14 gun tractors were also “A” vehicles, but the delivery of these
smaller vehicles was accomplished via tank transporters due to their
low weight and small size.
In contrast to the German Army during 1944-1945, the Canadian
Army was totally mechanized in all areas that required softskinned “B” vehicles. This very large motor pool was one of First
Canadian Army’s greatest strengths. It allowed Canadian forces
to be very mobile and carry out all logistic tasks, increasing their
military effectiveness. As opposed to occasional A combat vehicle
shortages, there was never a shortage of soft-skinned transport in
Canadian units. The 31 August 1944 “B” vehicle return for the 2nd
Canadian Infantry Division shows 125 General Service 3-ton lorries
on strength as opposed to its war establishment number of 104,
making it significantly over-strength. 39 In comparison, the German
12th ss Panzer Division as of 1 June 1944 had only 65 per cent of its

LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,472. 14th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary August
1944. T-16371. 7 August 1944. The British field ordnance park in question for this
exchange was designated a “Royal Artillery re-organization centre”.
39  
LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,553. 21st AG. A & B Canadian Vehicle Position Report.
File 215A21.085 (D1). 31 August 1944 return. “B” vehicle state for the 2nd Canadian
Infantry Division as of 31 August 1944.
38  
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REME troops with their Diamond T 969A Wrecker working on a disabled Universal Carrier
in the centre of Cahagnes, 2 August 1944. Canadian crews would have looked very much like
these. [© IWM (B 8498)]

authorized number of trucks operational, and only 33 per cent of its
gun tractors.40
Unsophisticated general service (gs) vehicles could be used in
multiple roles by virtually any type of unit. Some examples of gs
“B” vehicles within the Canadian Army were 3-ton lorries and jeeps.
Many were produced in the United Kingdom (u. k .) with a righthand drive, while others were of North American manufacture. Not
being afv s, they could only sustain low amounts of damage and had
a limited capability to mount weapons. More specialist Canadian
Army “B” vehicles, such as petrol tankers and command caravans,
came with assigned drivers to operate them. Documentation for
these vehicles had to follow the vehicle from point to point, and their
employment and status was monitored constantly.
As shown in Chart 7, the British 21st Army Group vehicle depots
would release “B” vehicles as authorized by 2nd Canadian Corps
and later First Canadian Army headquarters. Released “B” vehicles
would travel directly to either to the Canadian corps-level ordnance
Russell Hart, Clash of Arms: How the Allies Won in Normandy (Boulder, CO:
Lynne Reimer Publishing, 2001), 225. This state of affairs reduced the mobility of
the division in Normandy drastically.

40  
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Chart 7: First Canadian Army vehicle path chart for “B” vehicle replacement.41

field park or a delivery point near the division-level ordnance field
park. Unit drivers would sign for the new vehicles on a need basis
at the dp near the divisional ordnance field park. gs category “B”
vehicles that were repaired by rceme maintenance units would also
go directly to the dp s near the divisional ordnance field park, where
they would also be picked up by unit drivers. New and repaired
41

LAC, RG24 Volume 10,663. First Canadian Army Plans Diagram of “B” vehicle
delivery/replacement. File 215C1.045 (D12); John Grodzinski, Operational Handbook,
93, Appendix D: Canadian Army System of Supply of Ordnance Stores in the Field
Chart 1944.

41  
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specialized vehicles such as wreckers, radio vehicles and ambulances
would be assembled at the corps-level ordnance field park. From this
point, these specialist vehicles could be dispersed to unit dp s, but
only with the proper documentation and the assigned driver. Only
2.5 per cent of the respective corps total unit holdings of various
technical vehicles would be held in divisional field ordnance parks
and dp s as replacements.
The Canadian Army’s recovery and repair system for maintaining
its inventories of vehicles, weapons and equipment during the
campaign in nwe was maintained by units of rceme . Its creation
and the repair and recovery systems utilized by its units were directly
influenced by the introduction of the British Army equivalent, The
Corps of Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (r eme), which
officially came into being in October 1942. In October 1941, the
British Beveridge Report had identified the need to properly employ
large numbers of skilled tradesmen, engineers and technicians which
had hurriedly been put into uniform in the mobilization of 1939.42
This recruitment had stripped a section of British industry that
desperately needed their skills. At the same time, these personnel
were not being correctly employed within the military to utilize their
capabilities. It was deemed necessary to release some of these some
personnel for civilian wartime production and re-enroll those still
needed within the British Army to utilise their technical expertise
for maintenance duties.
The subsequent British Sinclair-Weeks-Dunkly Report of
February 1942 went further to recommend the creation of a new
corps of electrical and mechanical engineers. This corps would mainly
affect British Royal Ordnance Corps (roc) engineering personnel
then currently responsible for repair, recovery and replacement duties.
After royal assent, this corps became r eme and it was officially
incorporated into the British Army in the fall of that year.43 New
processes came into effect simultaneously to allow the recovery and
repair of all British Army vehicles, weapons and equipment in the
shortest amount of time.

Murray Johnston, Canada’s Craftsmen at 50: the Story of Electrical and
Mechanical Engineering in the Canadian Armed Forces, electronic edition (Borden,
ON: The Guild of the Electrical and Mechanical Engineering Branch Charitable
Trust, 2008), 267.
43  
Ibid, 268.
42  
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In May 1942, the commander of the cao, Lieutenant-General
Andrew McNaughton, pointed out the importance of keeping cao
systems for recovery, repair and maintenance as similar as possible
to the British while minimizing organizational change. As a result,
British reme processes were officially introduced into the Canadian
Army as of January 1943, but personnel affected by these processes
remained in the rcoc . Despite two-thirds of all rcoc personnel by
1942 being involved in maintenance or other engineering roles (E
Branch) rather than logistic stores roles, resistance to the creation of
a new corps was prevalent within the upper levels of rcoc leadership,
made up of senior (O Branch) stores officers. While still not having
created a new corps, by the time Canadian forces participated in the
Sicilian Campaign in the summer of 1943, British r eme processes
had been fully adopted. Overworked divisional workshops had been
reorganized into multiple brigade workshops and regimental level
LADs within participating Canadian formations.44
Due to pressure from on-loan r eme British officers within cmhq
and public debate within the parliament in Ottawa spurred on by the
civilian Canadian Engineering Institute and its publications, discussion
within the cao regarding the creation of a separate corps regained
strength in the spring and summer of 1943.45 Further meetings within
cmhq over operational planning details of Operation Overlord, the
invasion of France, acknowledged the need for a separate mechanical
engineering corps within the cao. Official organizational change that
created the Canadian Corps of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers
(ceme) finally came into effect on 1 February 1944, one year and six
months after the official incorporation of r eme into the British Army.
With royal assent, ceme became rceme on 2 April 1944, just in time
for the Normandy invasion.46 With this act, virtually the entire “E”
Branch of the rcoc were rebadged to become the first members of
rceme . This final transformation put the final administrative and
command touches on the maintenance process evolution within the
fully mechanized cao. It was now more capable than ever of keeping
Murray Johnston, Canada’s Craftsmen: The Story of the Corps of Royal Canadian
Electrical and Mechanical Engineers and of the Land Ordnance Engineering Branch
(Ottawa: RCEME Corps History, 1983), 167.
45  
R.H. Hodgson, Doug Knight (Editor), The RCEME History Series Volume 1: The
Formation of the Corps of Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers,
electronic version (Ottawa, ON: The RCEME Corps Fund, 2016), 21.
46  
Murray Johnston, Canada’s Craftsmen at 50, 269.
44  
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a major percentage of cao vehicles and major weapons systems
operational. The creation of an entirely new army corps and adoption
of new repair and recovery processes were significant mileposts
in the evolution of the Canadian Army during the Second World
War. Overcoming extreme institutional resistance, former rcoc “E”
Branch officers had finally prevailed to make the cao significantly
more operationally effective.
When conducting operations, the cao’s recovery and repair system
was divided into levels so that no one area was overstressed by its
workload. If there was an over load at one level, or the task was too
complicated, it would be passed to the next successive level, commonly
designated as a “line”. As illustrated in Charts 8 and 9, rceme had
a total of four “lines” of maintenance to repair mechanical faults or
battle damage. First-line was the organic repair services attached
to the combat arms regiments. Further lines (levels) after this took
on successively more difficult and complicated repair and rebuilding
assignments. The majority of the work in the rceme workshops and
lad s was done prior to or after combat operations. Enemy action was
responsible for only a very small percentage of second-line workshop’s
tasks. Their workload was divided as follows: over 95 per cent of jobs
related to mechanical breakdowns, 2 per cent stemmed from battle
damage and 3 per cent involved road accidents.47 Each successive
line took on more difficult jobs that required more repair hours,
more replacement parts, other specialized tools and more specialized
tradesmen to accomplish. Items that were dealt with by the first
or second lines of maintenance were the easier jobs that could be
done quickly. This allowed maximum resources to be deployed into
repairing and making operational the maximum number of vehicles
in the shortest amount of time. For example, a vehicle or weapon
repair job that would take more than four hours was immediately
back-loaded out of a lad’s area of operations. Secondly, on occasions
during a rapid advance, the main body of a brigade-level rceme
workshop could be split into two sections if necessary, establishing
rear or forward advanced workshop detachments (awd and rwd).
These were non-standard special teams detached from the workshop
to meet a particular temporary need. It could be made as large or
small as the tactical situation demanded. These teams were tasked
with providing advanced recovery and repair services in cooperation
Ibid, 42.

47  
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Chart 8: First Canadian Army lines of maintenance for the recovery and repair of “A” and “B”
vehicles and major weapons systems.48

with rceme first-line maintenance lad s at the regimental level or
remaining behind a brigade workshop’s main body as it advanced. If
needed, the awd could act as the link between the first and second
lines of maintenance, these two lines taking the lion’s share of repair,
recovery and maintenance duties.49
48

Ibid, 42-44.
Ibid, 42.

48  
49  
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The first-line maintenance capability within the combat arms
regiments consisted of the lad workshops. One was attached to each
rca and cac regiment, the infantry lad s held at the brigade level.
For example, the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade’s three regiments
had the following lad s, each manned by rceme troops:50 the 6th
Canadian Armoured Regiment contained the No. 54 lad, the 10th
Canadian Armoured Regiment was assigned the No. 55 lad and the
27th Canadian Armoured Regiment was issued the No. 85 lad.
These small light detachments were designed to be extremely
mobile and had a minimum number of personnel, vehicles and
equipment. They dealt with easily correctable problems that afv and
gun crews could aid in resolving within a certain time limit. They
put maximum effort into these easier problems and “back-loaded”
(sent to the rear) what could not be handled quickly or was beyond
their capabilities. The main duties of the lad were light welding,
mechanical repairs and assisting in maintenance questions. They
were spread evenly throughout the regimental administrative (A1,
A2, B) echelons of the regiment they were assigned to. Though they
contained limited capabilities, the lad s could work very hard in
cooperation with the crews to make a large number of small repairs
in a very short period of time. As an example, No. 54 lad of the 1st
Hussars (6th Canadian Armoured Regiment) made a titanic effort to
repair tanks in the aftermath of the disastrous 11 June battle at Le
Mesnil-Patry, where heavy losses were suffered.51
afv s, vehicles, and ordnance back-loaded by a regimental lad for
second or third-line maintenance would be collected by its respective
brigade workshops’ recovery platoon assets and back-loaded to the
brigade collection point. This collection point was within the workshop’s
base of operations or very near to it. It also worked closely with the
three regiments of each brigade, but also with divisional troops, such
as the field artillery, machine gun and anti-tank regiments. The lad’s
from these divisional units would be designated to feed a certain
brigade workshop in exactly the same manner as one of the armoured
or infantry brigade’s regimental lad s. There was no major difference
between the duties of an armoured or infantry brigade workshop.

Ibid, 327, Appendix 5.
LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,213. 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars)
War Diary June 1944. Reference was made on this date to a large effort made by No.
54 LAD to repair a significant number of damaged tanks.
50  
51  
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The crew of a Sherman tank of the Westminster Dragoons (2nd County of London Yeomanry)
repairing damage to one of its suspension units caused by an 88mm anti-tank shell, 7 June
1944 caption. Canadian tank crews would have repaired mine damage in this manner.

[© IWM (B 5423)]

For an infantry brigade, its brigade workshop would collect, repair
or back-load all infantry afv s, vehicles and ordnance in exactly the
same manner as the armoured brigade workshop.
Canadian Army second-line rceme repair assets consisted of
the main body of the brigade workshop. As an example, the 2nd
Canadian Armoured Brigade had the 2nd Armoured Brigade
Workshop assigned to it. Despite the misnomer, the brigade workshop
operated in what was considered a divisional-level repair area if the
workshop in question was part of an infantry or armoured division.
The second-line brigade workshop’s main bodies in armoured or
infantry divisions were to be located no more than two hours from
the location of the lad. These main bodies were not very mobile, and
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REME troops work to repair the track on a Sherman tank in heavy rain, near Geilenkirchen,
Germany, 25 November 1944. [© IWM (B 12087)]

had trouble keeping up with the rapid advances of First Canadian
Army in August and September 1944.
This was especially the case with workshops operating within the
4th Canadian Armoured Division. In response, its brigade workshops
from September 1944 onwards began to be sited very near the front.
In this case, the need for an awd special team was removed and
the main body of the brigade workshop took on its role. If needed
a rwd would remain far to the rear with less mobile elements,
totally reversing the standard procedure. The three infantry brigade
workshops within the two Canadian infantry divisions in nwe after
August 1944 also struggled to remain close to the moving front
lines. To mitigate the distances one workshop’s entire main body was
always located forward, the other two located further to the rear or
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in transit.52 Also within the second-line maintenance structure was
the 2nd Canadian Corps Troops Workshop. This facility provided
repair services for corps-level units. The lad s of corps-level combat
units would feed the corps workshop in exactly the same process as
the infantry and armoured lad s fed their brigade workshop.
If an afv or other equipment was sent off strength (sos) as a
repair casualty to a second-line maintenance unit, it was taken off
the strength of its original regiment. It was now on the strength of the
respective rceme unit, and all further repair work would be completed
by rceme personnel.53 The repair process was quite flexible, and
there was no rule that a certain squadron’s tank had to return to its
respective squadron or regiment. As a new or repaired similar tank
emerged from the repair and reinforcement pipeline, it would instead
take its place and be delivered by the 25th cadr forward squadron.
Despite the infantry and armoured titles, the armoured and
infantry brigade workshops also worked on afv s and other ordnance
that was employed by the rca field artillery and anti-tank units.
Artillery op tanks, self-propelled howitzers, self-propelled anti-tank
guns and artillery towers all broke down and suffered battle damage
at the same rate as infantry and armoured unit afv s. If a rca artillery
afv was finished repairs, the designated 25th cadr squadron would
deliver this vehicle to an rca unit in exactly the same manner as it
would to an armoured unit. As part of its role, the corps-level “E”
Squadron, 25th cadr was responsible for delivering tracked artillery
“A” vehicles directly to the rca regiments. The “B”,”C”, “D” and “G”
squadrons of the 25th cadr were responsible for the tank equipped
Canadian armoured brigades.54
The third line of rceme maintenance was designated to complete
the rebuilding and reconditioning of equipment. This was not a
service available within the first and second lines as shown in Chart
9. Rebuilding and reconditioning took a very long period of time and
had to be completed in a static factory-like environment. In these

Ibid, 65.
LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,553. A & B Canadian Vehicle Position Report. File
215A21.085 (D1). 21st AG 30 November, 1944-31 January 1945 returns. Divisional
vehicles strengths in this time period do often go down, but this is not to enemy
action but due to mechanical repairs.
54  
LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,278. E Squadron, 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery
Regiment War Diary December 1944. Multiple entries regarding the delivery of RCA
self-propelled artillery pieces and Ram tracked gun tractors (towers) exist.
52  
53  
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locations detailed and complicated work could take place out of the
way of the elements and enemy action. This was their designated
role, but the majority of their work was overflow from second-line
maintenance. The corps troops, armoured brigade and infantry brigade
workshops could all feed overflow repair cases directly to third-line
units. The No. 2 Tank Troops Workshop was an example of a thirdline rceme asset in the summer of 1944. This facility was used as an
overflow catch point for overworked second-line brigade workshops.55
The third-line maintenance units lacked integral transport, and faced
extreme difficulties in remaining at a fixed distance from second-line
workshop bases. If one was ordered to move forward, others stayed
in place as long as they could to remain effective and take on the
moving unit’s workload. All third-line maintenance facilities were
under the command of the First Canadian Army Deputy Director of
Mechanical Engineering (ddme) as of 1 September 1944.56
Canadian Army fourth-line maintenance was a capability that
existed in the form of the No. 1 and No. 2 Advanced Base Workshops.
The No. 1 Canadian Base Workshop, as the parent organization of
these fourth-line facilities, remained in the u. k . These organizations
were commanded by the Director of Mechanical Engineering (dme),
21st Army Group. These fourth-line assets were designed to be
available at the rate of one per Canadian corps. They provided
factory-like rebuilding and reconditioning services for vehicles and
other major pieces of equipment on a higher level than third line.
These groups could also be utilized for special missions in addition to
their designated roles. For example, No. 1 Advanced Base Workshop
inspected and performed maintenance on over 400 guns prior to
Operation Totalize in early August 1944. It also rebuilt and repaired
large numbers of submerged vehicles that had been recovered from
the Juno and Sword Beach landing areas in Normandy.57 If thirdline maintenance assets could not handle a job or were overloaded,
these two facilities could assist in completing, rebuilding and
reconditioning tasks.58 Specialized recovery assets in the army-level
line of communications area also existed. The rceme Canadian Army
No. 2 and later No. 1 and No. 3 Recovery Companies operated in

Murray Johnston, Canada’s Craftsmen at 50, 70-71.
Ibid, 65.
57  
Ibid, 74.
58  
Ibid, 64.
55  
56  
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Chart 9: First Canadian Army process for “A” & “B” vehicle and major weapons system
recovery and repair.(Armoured Division example).60
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the strategic route-clearing c and recovery role past the corps and
divisional areas of responsibility. Prior to August 1944, there was
little vehicle and equipment back-loading above the regimental and
brigade level due to the small area within the Normandy beachhead.
As the breakout from Normandy developed in August 1944, these
activities increased as broken-down vehicles were littered across
northern France.59
Once repairs were completed, the vehicle or piece of ordnance
would be sent on its way. Using an afv as an example, once it was
deemed “fit” by a repair line of maintenance, it was immediately
shipped back to the relevant squadron of the 25th cadr . At that
point, it would be sent off strength (sos) of the rceme unit that
had worked on it and was now on the strength with the 25th cadr
squadron. Once the 25th cadr squadron delivered it, the afv would
join the strength the armoured or rca artillery unit, and the circle was
complete. At its height in May 1945, the rceme repair organization
was large and extremely capable. A total of 150 rceme units and subunits existed, from the lad detachments within combat arms units to
fourth-line maintenance facilities located in static locations.
In conclusion, this article has presented a short overview of
Canadian Army recovery, repair and replacement procedures and
its performance record in maintaining the maximum number of
operational “A” and “B” vehicles and major weapons systems during
its campaign in nwe 1944-1945. Canadian Army personnel utilizing
these procedures proved extremely effective at maintaining vehicle
and weapon strength within the cao. The existence of effective rceme ,
rcoc and 25th cadr procedures and operations are historically
significant due to their being largely responsible for maintaining the
combat strength of the Canadian Army in the late war period. The
cao in nwe was very lucky to employ what were largely British Army
procedures which had evolved by trial and error during 1939-1943
into a very sophisticated system in the late war period. During the
Italian campaign in 1943-1944, the Canadian Army had opportunity
to practice these methods in the field. On its arrival in nwe , familiar
practices were put into action with excellent results. Canadian
60
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combat arms regiments were never hindered in their operations due
to any sort of shortage of “A” or “B” type vehicles or major weapons
systems.
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